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ARTICLES
THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST STUDIO
OWNERSHIP OF THEATERS:
ARE THEY AN ANACHRONISM?
Brian J. Wolf*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1940's, the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures
in the United States have been controlled by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.' That case resulted in a series
of consent decrees negotiated by the defendant studios and the Department
of Justice ("Paramount Consent Decrees"). These judgments included
licensing prohibitions and divestiture orders requiring the separation of
exhibition from production and distribution.2
Today, many, including the Department of Justice, consider the decrees
to be obsolete or redundant.3 On February 7, 1992, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York approved an order
terminating the following judgments: the 1952 Loew's Consent Judgment,
the 1980 Loew's Modification Order and the 1987 Tri-Star Order ("Loew's
Consent Judgments").4
*Brian J. Wolf is a third year law student at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, California.
He received his M.A. from the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of
Southern California in 1985 and his B.A. from the University of Texas at Austin in 1984.
The author wishes to dedicate this article to his family. The author also thanks Professor
Lionel Sobel for his assistance, insight and comments.
1. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), on remand, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 339
U.S. 984 (1950).
2. Affidavit of Benjamin Klein in Support of Loew's Motion to Terminate the 1952 Consent
Decree at 11, United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 89 Civ. 6159)
[hereinafter Klein Affidavit]; Memorandum of the United States in Response to Motion of Loew's
To Terminate The 1952 Loew's Consent Judgment at 5, United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F.
Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 89 Civ. 6159) [hereinafter Government Memorandum].
3. Memorandum of Loew's Theater Management Corp. and Sony Pictures in Support of Their
Motion for Termination of the 1952 Loew's Consent Judgment at 12, United States v. Loew's
Inc., 705 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 89 Civ. 6159) [hereinafter Loew's Memorandum].
4. United States v. Loew's Inc., 783 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Proponents of repealing the decrees argue that the general antitrust laws
are sufficient protection against anti-competitive behavior. For example,
laws such as the Sherman, Clayton and Hart-Scott-Rodino Acts provide the
same prohibitions against price fixing, unreasonable restraints of trade and
covert agreements as the Paramount case.' Furthermore, technological
innovations as well as changes in consumer demand have radically altered
the marketing and distribution of motion pictures. Unlike the 1940's, a
wide range of alternative distribution systems such as videocassettes and
pay television are now available to the public.
This article begins with a historical analysis of vertical integration in the
motion picture industry.6 In the past, vertical integration was associated
with anti-competitive practices.' However, vertical integration is not the
source of harmful behavior such as "block booking,"8 price fixing and
illegal restraints of trade. Moreover, there is no realistic possibility of a
return to the economic structure or potential anti-competitive business
practices of the 1930's and 1940's.
Studio ownership of theaters is one of several issues arising out of the
relationship between distributors and exhibitors.9 However, it would be
beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss each anti-competitive practice
in depth. Accordingly, this paper focuses on vertical integration in the
motion picture industry and answers the question of whether or not the
prohibitions against studio ownership of theaters are a historical hangover
that have long since outlived their usefulness."
5. Claudia Eller, Palmieri Death Raises Issue of Consent Decrees' Survival, TiE HOLLYWOOD
REP., June 19, 1989, at 1, 16.
6. See infra Part II. Vertical integration is when two or more companies at different levels
of a particular activity merge. An example is when a producer or a distributor of a specific
product or service merges with a retailer. PHILLP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 207 (1980).
7. MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 1, 16 (1960).
8. Block booking is the process whereby a studio will only release pictures in groups. Thus,
the only way a theater may secure access to potential "blockbusters" is to also agree to show
other movies that have less widespread appeal.
9. For purposes of this article, the word "studio" denotes a major producer who also
distributes motion pictures.
10. See infra part I.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Vertical Integration
Vertical integration in the motion picture industry surfaced in 1917
when twenty-six of the largest first-run theater chains formed a combine for
buying and booking films into their theaters. Combines enabled exhibitors
of films to bargain as a group rather than individually against distributors
and producers. By combining forces, exhibitors increased their leverage in
negotiations for films and apportioned costs based on projected earnings for
each theater chain."
As power of the combines increased, studios responded by purchasing
their own theaters. By securing first-run theater outlets, studios could
decrease uncertainty in negotiations, eliminate monopoly premiums and
reduce costs." Ralph Cassady summarized the advantages and potential
abuses of theater ownership as follows:
The ownership of theaters ... not only provided companies with
markets for films but provided them with a powerful instrument for
gaining competitive advantages over others. Theater control gave
rise to discriminatory first-run privileges, arbitrary clearance
arrangements, and monopolistic influences on the sales policies of
other distributors. Integrated operation permitted manipulation of
admission prices to the advantage of the affiliated theaters. 3
Loew's Incorporated ("Loew's"), an exhibitor, entered production and
distribution when it purchased Metro Pictures Corporation in 1920. In
1924, Loew's merged Goldwyn Pictures with Metro to form Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer. 4  Warner Brothers ("Warner") and Radio-Keith
Orpheum ("RKO") rose to predominance with the arrival of sound pictures.
Warner introduced talking pictures in order to gain a foothold in exhibition.
Due to the phenomenal success of 'The Jazz Singer" in 1927, Warner was
able to purchase over 300 theaters by 193015 The Radio Corporation of
America formed RKO in 1928 to exploit the Photophone sound-on-film
11. CONANT, supra note 7, at 24.
12. Tino Balio, A Mature Oligopoly, 1930-1948, in TliE AMERIcAN FILM INDUsTRY 253,260-
61 (Tino Balio ed., 1985).
13. Ralph Cassady Jr., Impact Of The Paramount Decision On Motion Picture Distribution
and Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 150, 156 (1958).
14. Tino Balio, Struggles for Control, 1908-1930, in THE AMERICAN FILM INDUsTRY 103,
121 (Tino Balio ed., 1985).
15. Id. at 127-28.
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system. RKO was a combination of a production-distribution company and
the 200 screen Keith-Albee-Orpheum Theater circuit.
16
By 1930, the motion picture industry was a mature oligopoly dominated
by five vertically integrated companies: Warner, Paramount, Loew's, RKO
and Fox. 7 These five major studios not only produced motion pictures,
but operated worldwide distribution networks and owned circuits of
theaters. In this way the major companies could cooperate within their own
circle where each entity would guarantee that the other's films would
receive guaranteed play dates. 8 The three "mini-majors," Universal,
Columbia and United Artists, both produced and distributed motion
pictures, but did not own their own theaters. 9 These three smaller entities
were nonetheless part of the cooperative scheme between the studios for
domination of the market.' °
Together, these eight studios pooled their interests, acted in concert and
established a market cartel.2' In 1945, the five major studios owned
approximately 17% of theaters nationwide, (3,137 out of 18 ,0 76 ).'
Although this was not a major percentage of the national market, the
holdings of these five studios included the great majority of first-run
theaters in the largest metropolitan regions.' Studio-produced pictures
were released to their own theaters. They delayed release to non-studio-
owned theaters until film-goers had already paid to see the release in a
studio-owned theater. As a result, these studios controlled 70% of the
national box office receipts and collected 95% of all film rentals.24 In this
way, these five major distributors monopolized first-run exhibition and
discriminated against independent exhibitors.
The studios also instituted a series of anti-competitive practices. One
such practice was setting unreasonable clearance dates, which prevented
16. Id. at 130.
17. Il at 130. An oligopoly is where a few sellers have a dominant share of the market.
RicHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAYSiS OF LAW 220 (1977).
18. Balio, supra note 12, at 253.
19. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), on remand, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949),
aff'd, 339 U.S. 984 (1950).
20. Id.
21. A cartel is an organization of companies whose purpose is to control or fix prices and the
conditions of sale. MARTIN BRONFENBRENNER Er AL., MICROECONOMICS 293 (1984).
22. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 167.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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non-studio-owned theaters from showing the first-run films too early.'
Studios also began block booking and general price fixing in order to
maximize profits and subordinate all independent operators. For example,
distributors arranged marketing patterns so the newest and best pictures
played initially in a downtown, studio-controlled theater. These theaters
charged the highest admission price.' "Sub-run" theaters, owned by
independents, were relegated to "the lowest status in the hierarchy."'27
Thus, independents were allowed to run pictures only after the clearance
period. By controlling clearance times, the major studios sustained the
preferred status of their own theaters.
Block booking also provided a useful means to discriminate against
independents. Only unaffiliated theaters were required to purchase blocks
of films. Thus, the major studios were able to select "only the best of each
other's pictures," at the expense of independent exhibitors.'
The major studios also restrained trade by fixing prices.29 For
instance, distributors stipulated minimum admission prices in their licensing
agreements and controlled prices in their own theaters. This practice
eliminated price competition and held prices artificially high.30
B. The Paramount Decisions
The Paramount decisions were a response by independent theater
owners to years of anti-competitive treatment. The Department of Justice
filed the first suit on July 20, 1938.3" The government accused the five
major studios of restraining trade by monopolizing the production,
distribution and exhibition of motion pictures in violation of the Sherman
25. Clearance is defined as the number of days that must pass before a picture that has opened
in the theater can open in another theater in certain areas. United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. at 144 n.6. "Unreasonable clearance" is a restrictive trade practice that stifles
competition since studios control clearance periods and when pictures can be run. They also
segment the theater market by manipulating locations and prices. See Balio, supra note 12, at
258; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. at 330.
26. Balio, supra note 12, at 259.
27. CONANT, supra note 7, at 68.
28. Balio, supra note 12, at 258; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 156-
57.
' 29. CONANT, supra note 7, at 58; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 141-
42.
30. CONANT, supra note 7, at 70; Balio, supra note 12, at 260; United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 144-46.
31. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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Antitrust Act. 2 The government also charged Columbia, Universal and
United Artists of combining with the five vertically integrated companies
to restrain trade and monopolize commerce.3
Preliminary negotiations between the government and the defendants
resulted in a consent decree entered into on November 20, 1940.'
Without admitting guilt, the eight defendants agreed to modify or eliminate
certain trade practices in exchange for the government's agreement not to
seek separation of the studios from their theaters. For example, the studios
agreed to limit block booking to groups of five films, allow arbitration for
disputes over runs and clearances, and suspend future theater purchases.3"
The first consent decree provided that after three years the government
could apply to the court for modification. Because illegal practices
continued, the government exercised its option to revise the case and moved
for trial in 1944 to seek divorcement of production-distribution from
exhibition. A trial resulted in the conviction of the eight studio defendants
for conspiracy in restraint of trade.36 The district court held that the
following practices were illegal: 1) fixing admission prices," 2) uniform
systems of runs and clearances," 3) formula deals,
39 4) block booking,40
32. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[elvery contract, combination ... or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States... is hereby declared to
be illegal." Section 2 states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person ... to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States ... shall be guilty of a felony...." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1982).
33. The five major defendants ("the five majors") included Paramount Pictures, Inc.
("Paramount'); Loew's Inc. ("Loew's"); Twentieth Century-Fox ("Fox"); Radio-Keith Orpheum
Corporation ("RKO"); and Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. ("Warner"). The three minor defendants
("the three minors") included Universal Corporation ("Universal"); Columbia Pictures Corporation
("Columbia"); and United Artist Corporation ("UA"). The three minors produced and distributed
motion pictures, but did not own theaters. CONANT, supra note 7, at 94; Gerald F. Phillips, The
Recent Acquisition of Theater Circuits by Major Distributors, THE ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter
1987, at 21 n.5.
34. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 141 n.3. A consent decree is an
agreement by the defendants to discontinue practices declared to be illegal by the government.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 214 (abr. 5th ed. 1983).
35. Cassady, supra note 13, at 157; CONANT, supra note 7, at 95; United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. at 331-33.
36. CONANT, supra note 7, at 97-98; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at
141 n.3; Phillips, supra note 33, at 10.
37. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. at 334, 340.
38. Id. at 343.
39. A formula deal is where a film is licensed to an entire circuit instead of a particular
theater Id. at 347.
40. Id. at 350.
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and 5) pooling agreements4 The decrees also required that each picture
be licensed on a "theater-by-theater basis without discriminating against
affiliated circuits or theaters." 42
The district court, in its initial opinion, did not order separation of
production and distribution from exhibition. The court's reasoning was
based upon the fact that the defendants only controlled around one-sixth of
the total screens in the United States. Therefore, it was unlikely that the
studios could exert enough monopoly power to warrant "the drastic remedy
of complete divestiture."43 Rather than ordering divestiture, the district
court established a mandatory system of competitive bidding.' The
district court believed "the opportunity of independents to compete under
the bidding system for pictures and runs renders such a harsh remedy as
complete divestiture unnecessary." 5
According to the court, ownership of theaters was not the "root of the
difficulties."'  Vertical integration was only a "means of carrying out the
restraints and conspiracies."'47  Certainly, the major studios denied
independent exhibitors access in many key markets. However, this
foreclosure problem did not stem from the vertical structure of the industry
per se. Rather, independents could not obtain films because of a horizontal
conspiracy among the studios to fix prices and discriminate in favor of their
own theaters.4" The concentrated market structure in exhibition facilitated
horizontal collusion and the subsequent foreclosure of independents, due to
the limited number of theaters in any particular area. The majors turned to
building and acquiring theaters regionally to avoid competing directly in the
same markets.49
41. Pooling is an agreement between two or more exhibitors to operate collectively with
prearranged percentages. IL at 350-51.
42. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. at 358.
43. Id.
44. Phillips, supra note 33, at 10; CONANT, supra note 7, at 102; United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. at 353, 358.
45. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. at 353.
46. Id at 355; Phillips, supra note 33, at 11.
47. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. at 893; Phillips, supra note 33, at
11.
48. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. at 884, 893; see also William J.
Borner, Motion Picture Split Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis, 52 FORDHAm L. REVIEW 159,
168-80 (1983).
49. Cities with populations of less than 100,000 people were generally monopolized by one
studio. For example, each of the following four studios enjoyed monopoly status in the
corresponding percentage of those markets in which they had an interest: Warner, 89%;
Paramount, 88%; Loew's, 77%; and RKO, 96%. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85
F. Supp. at 889-90; CONANrT, supra note 7, at 52.
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Furthermore, the studios practiced a "broad policy of reciprocity" and
gave each other preferential treatment in securing bookings." For
example, in markets like Chicago, where Paramount was the dominant
exhibitor, the four other majors agreed to release their pictures exclusively
to Paramount's theaters. In exchange, Paramount respected the "preemptive
claim" on first-run films in markets with theaters affiliated with one of the
other majors. 1 In return for allowing Paramount films to play in another
studio's controlled market, Paramount agreed to give preferential treatment
to that studio's theaters in Chicago.
On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to hold that vertical integration
was illegal under the Sherman Act. 2 However, the Court held there were
instances when vertical integration could be illegal. For instance, vertical
integration was unlawful if created with the intent to monopolize a market
or accompanied by an intent to control a market. 3 The Supreme Court
rejected the district court's remedy of competitive bidding because the
practice was ineffective and too difficult to administer.'
The Supreme Court remanded the case so the district court could
reconsider the divestiture issue.55 On remand, the district court reversed
its initial position regarding divestiture. The court determined that the five
major defendants monopolized the first-run theater business through a
horizontal conspiracy to fix prices, runs and clearances. Moreover, because
the conspiracy was "powerfully aided by the system of vertical integration,"
vertical integration was illegal in this case. 6 As a result, separation of
exhibition from distribution was "the only adequate means of terminating
the conspiracy and preventing any resurgence of monopoly power on the
part of the remaining defendants. 5 7
A series of consent decrees entered into between 1948 and 1952
outlined the specific aspects of the separation of studios from their
theaters.58  The district court ordered the five major defendants to divest
50. Michael Conant, The Paramount Decrees Reconsidered, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79,
80 (1981).
51. Id. at 155.
52. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
53. Id. at 174-75.
54. Id. at 161, 165-66.
55. Id. at 178.
56. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. at 893.
57. Id. at 896; see also Phillips, supra note 33, at 10.
58. The original consent decrees are reported as follows: United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 62,335 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1948) (RKO); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1949)
(Paramount); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) J[ 62,573 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
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their theaters. Warner, Fox and Loew's were prohibited from reentering the
exhibition arena without prior court approval.59 All defendants were
required to license films on a theater-by-theater basis without discrimina-
tion.60
RKO and Paramount agreed to divorce their theater holdings before the
district court rendered this decision. In exchange for this settlement with
the government, RKO and Paramount received more lenient terms than the
other studios. For example, RKO and Paramount were not required to seek
court approval to purchase theaters in the future as were Warner, Fox and
Loew's. United Artists, Universal and Columbia owned no theaters during
the Paramount litigation and were not precluded from theater ownership in
the future. However, these minor defendants were subject to the same
prohibitions against price-fixing and other anti-competitive practices. 1
Furthermore, even though the court ordered the majors to divest all theater
holdings, no court has ever held that it is illegal under the antitrust laws for
studios to own theaters. 62
C. The Impact of The Paramount Decrees
The Paramount Decrees changed the structure and marketing practices
of the motion picture industry. It is unknown to what extent the new
competition reduced ticket prices, encouraged independent production and
affected the quality, content and diversity of films. Under the provisions
of the decrees, unaffiliated exhibition subsidiaries were formed from the
divested theaters. However, during the 1950's, theater attendance dropped
markedly because audiences changed their movie-going habits. Intrigued
by the novelty of television, people found little time to patronize the motion
picture theaters. As audience sizes declined, theater prices increased. By
1956, over 4,000 theaters had closed.63
During the 1950's and 1960's, populations moved out of the inner
cities. Drive-ins and multiplex theaters emerged in the suburbs. Distribu-
8,1950) (Columbia, Universal and UA); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH)
162,861 (S.D.N.Y June 7, 1952) (Fox); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,765 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1951) (Warner); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1952 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,228 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1952) (Loew's).
59. Phillips, supra note 33, at 11; Conant, supra note 50, at 105.
60. See Klein Affidavit, supra note 2, at 11; Government Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6.
61. Phillips, supra note 33, at 11; Conant, supra note 50, at 105.
62. Phillips, supra note 33, at 11 & 21 n.6.
63. Tino Balio, Retrenchment, Reappraisal, and Reorganization, 1948-, in THE AMRCAN
FiLM INDUsTRY 401 (Tino Balio ed., 1985).
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tors responded to these changes by altering their marketing patterns.' For
example, wide releases replaced the system of runs and clearances, where
a picture would open in a downtown theater and play for several weeks
before being released to subrun. Today, distribution targets mass audiences
with multiple theaters playing the same picture simultaneously, supported
by extensive advertising expenditures.65
In The Paramount Decrees Reconsidered, Michael Conant argued,
"[a]fter the decrees a much freer market was created."66 For example,
after the major distributors relinquished control of the theaters, the door
opened for independent producers.67 On the other hand, the decrees did
not significantly reduce barriers to entry in distribution.6' Furthermore,
competition from television caused studios to produce fewer and more
expensive films. A trend toward higher budget motion pictures and a
concurrent reduction in movie-going resulted in further uncertainty and
increased risks within the film industry. The effect was that independent
exhibitors "found themselves bidding for a smaller supply of films in a
more competitive market." 69
III. ARE THE PARAMOUNT DECREES OBSOLETE?
A. The Return Of Vertical Integration
In 1981, the Justice Department began an investigation into the
possibility of vacating the consent decrees in United States v. Paramount
64. Conant, supra note 50, at 95-96.
65. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. 878, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), remanded, 882
F.2d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1989); Charles W. McCoy Jr., The Paramount Cases: Golden Anniversary
in a Rapidly Changing Marketplace, ANTITRUST, Summer 1988, at 32, 34.
66. Conant, supra note 50, at 107.
67. Id. at 84.
68. Id. at 90.
69. Id. at 107. After the decrees, distributors employed competitive bidding as a means to
conform to the prohibition against block booking and comply with the requirement of licensing
each picture "theater-by-theater." Exhibitors responded to this increase in competition by product
splitting. lL at 104. A product split is an agreement between exhibitors to allocate motion
pictures among themselves in order to eliminate competitive bidding. See Harkins Amusement
Enterprises, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477, 483-84 (9th Cir. 1988). The Justice
Department and many courts consider product splits to be illegal. See Conant, supra note 50, at
106; United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 756 F. 2d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 945 (1985); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1279
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
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Inc.7" In February 1985, the Justice Department announced that it would
not seek termination or modification of the decrees due to a lack of interest
by most of the distributor defendants.7 The Justice Department stated
that a decree that is initially pro-competitive and in the public interest could
"have unintended effects after the passage of time."72 As a result, the
Justice Department stated it may set a termination date in the future.
Therefore, the original decrees still impact the operations of the majority of
distributors and some exhibitors such as Cinamerica."
Loew's however, is no longer constrained by consent judgments.
Loew's filed a motion with the District Court for the Southern District of
New York on November 6, 1991 for an order terminating the consent
judgments.74 The court granted Loew's motion on February 7, 1992.
According to the court, changes in the marketing and distribution of films
since 1952 eliminate any "persuasive reason for maintaining the Judgment
and subjecting Loews to restrictions that do not bind other exhibition
circuits.
' 75
Columbia was the first major distributor to enter the theater business
after the Justice Department's 1985 review. In September of 1985,
Columbia paid $19.9 million for a 58% interest in the Walter Reade theater
chain, located in New York.76 On May 12, 1986, MCA, the parent
company of Universal, paid $162 million for a 50% interest in the
Canadian theater company, Cineplex-Odeon. 7  Tri-Star Pictures, a
subsidiary of Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., acquired Loew's Theater
Management Corp in 1986.78 The Justice Department permitted this
70. Suzanne Ilene Schiller, The Relationship Between Motion Picture Distribution and
Exhibition: An Analysis of the Effects of Anti-Blind Bidding Legislation, 9 COMM/ENT LJ. 131,
145 (1986).
71. Kim Isaac Eisler, Movie Distribution Won't Be Touched By Antitrust Unit, L.A. DAILY
J., Feb. 7, 1985, at 1.
72. Justice Department Decides Not To Seek Modification of Paramount Antitrust Consent
Decrees, ENT. L. REP., Feb. 1985, at 21.
73. Id.
74. Loew's Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.
75. United States v. Loew's Inc., 783 F. Supp. 211, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
76. Alex Ben Block, Garth Drabinsky's Pleasure Domes, FORBES, June 2, 1986, at 90, 93.
77. Id. at 92.
78. Will Tusher, Green Light For Acquisition of Half-Interest in G&W's 470-Screen U.S.
Holdings, DAILY VARmTY, Dec. 23, 1987, at 1, 22.
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acquisition pursuant to a 1980 motion by Loew's for relief from its consent
decree.79
As a result of its review of this acquisition, the Justice Department
proposed a six-part test for evaluating "the competitive effects of a vertical
merger" in the motion picture business."0 Vertical mergers and acquisi-
tions were to be evaluated based upon: 1) whether the relief would
foreclose other exhibitors from access to motion pictures or competitive
terms; 2) whether other distributors were foreclosed from access to theaters;
3) whether competitors were forced to vertically integrate to compete
without foreclosure; 4) whether such integration, if required, would be
difficult to achieve; 5) whether the market is conducive to non-competition
performance when vertical integration is required and cannot be achieved;
and 6) whether there are any offsetting positive benefits as a result of the
vertical merger.8
The government concluded that the relief sought by Tri-Star and Loew's
would not cause foreclosure, or force new entrants to vertically integrate in
order to compete. Furthermore, the Justice Department was so convinced
that the Tri-Star/Loew's acquisition would not create harmful market power
that it did not analyze the last three elements of the six-part test.'
In 1986, Paramount acquired 119 theaters for $285,000,000. Included
in this acquisition were the western regional chains of Mann Theaters and
Festival Enterprises as well as an eastern regional acquisition, Trans-Lux
(located in Connecticut and the upper east side of Manhattan). Paramount
combined those screens into one circuit called Cinamerica Theaters, L.P.
("Cinamerica"). 3 Warner believed it was competitively disadvantaged
because most of its competitors could purchase theaters without restrictions.
As a result, Warner filed a motion in August, 1986, with the District Court
79. In 1980, Loew's filed for permission to distribute motion pictures. The court granted the
motion on the condition that Loew's not exhibit pictures which it also distributed. In 1986, Tri-
Star acquired Loew's. Due to the 1980 order, Tri-Star was prevented from playing its own films
in Loew's theaters. As a result, Tri-Star and Loew's petitioned the court to allow Loew's to
exhibit Tri-Star's pictures. Even if Loew's had failed to seek authorization, Tri-Star could have
purchased Loew's without court permission. In addition, since Tri-Star was a "non-Paramount"
distributor, Tri-Star would not have been restricted in its dealings with Loew's. The court granted
the request without abandoning the conduct limitations of the 1952 Consent Judgment until
February 7, 1992. Loew's Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2, 5-6; Paul J. Tagliabue, Antitrust
Developments in Sports and Entertainment, 56 ANTITRUsT L.J. 343, 344 (1987); United States
v. Loew's Inc., 783 F. Supp. 211, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
80. Tagliabue, supra note 79, at 345.
81. 1l
82. l at 346.
83. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1989).
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for permission to engage in exhibition without prior court approval."
Warner argued that theater ownership would permit it to "compete on an
equal footing with its principle rivals," and diversify in a closely related
business."5 Judge Edmund Palmieri, the guardian of the consent decrees
for almost thirty years, issued an opinion granting Warner's motion on the
condition that Warner hold any acquired theaters separately and seek court
approval after a review by the Justice Department. 6
Pursuant to Palmieri's 1986 opinion requiring court approval of future
theater acquisitions, Warner, in 1987, notified the Justice Department of its
intent to purchase an interest in Cinamerica."7 Following the Tri-
Star/Loew's guidelines, the Justice Department's investigation concluded
that the Paramount-Warner acquisition would have no significant impact on
other exhibitors' access to films. As a result, the Justice Department
declined to challenge Warner's acquisition. According to Fred Haynes, of
the Justice Department's antitrust division, the foreclosure potential was
"not sufficiently significant to raise a problem under the antitrust laws."88
B. Antitrust Policy Objectives and Vertical Integration
In its petition to the district court seeking approval to purchase an
interest in Cinamerica, Warner relied on affidavits of Maurice Silverman,
a former government attorney responsible for monitoring the Paramount
consent decrees.89 Silverman argued that the antitrust laws are adequate
protection to insure competition in the motion picture industry.'o Judge
Palmieri responded that he did not "believe that the mere existence of the
antitrust laws ... is enough to permit us to sit back and allow the
dismantling of the consent judgments. 91
Both Palmieri and Silverman presided over the administration of the
consent decrees for over twenty-five years. Thus, the question arises as to
84. United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. 878, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), remanded, 882 F.2d
29, 30 (2d Cir. 1989).
85. United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. at 884.
86. Id. at 885. The original consent decree, which required Warner's to divest itself of all
theaters, also prohibited Warner from entering the exhibition market without applying to the
Attorney General. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 30.
87. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 31.
88. Tusher, supra note 78, at 22; United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. at 879.
89. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 31.
90. United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. at 892.
91. Id. at 885.
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which of these two preeminant authorities is correct. The answer depends
on whether antitrust policies should promote goals other than economic
efficiency. In general, there are two divergent positions regarding the
appropriate policy objectives of antitrust laws. Palmieri follows the
populist view that antitrust laws are designed to prevent large firms from
exploiting smaller enterprises. For populists, if not subject to regulation
and control, vertical integration may give rise to abuses.' On the other
hand, "the Chicago School" and Silverman argue that vertical integration
is completely innocent and that the goal of antitrust law is to serve
economic efficiency.93
1. Populists Arguments and Vertical Integration
Advocates of governmental regulation emphasize the need to promote
entrepreneurial innovation which creates opportunities for individuals or
smaller enterprises to excel. 4 The goal of antitrust law, for populists, is
to protect access to the market for smaller firms and prevent economic
abuse from large, politically powerful corporations.95 Populists assert "[a]
policy that protects opportunities for powerless businesses helps consumers
and fosters efficiency when carried out wisely."' Their fear is that giant
firms will wield too much political influence over our lives if left
unregulated. Furthermore, populists believe it is better for people to own
their own businesses because that structure results in the lowest prices and
best service for consumersY
Populists' primary concerns are that vertical integration will increase
barriers to entry and foreclose competitors from markets.9" In the motion
picture industry, foreclosure occurs if an exhibitor is excluded as a buyer
from a vertically integrated distributor favoring its own theaters or if a
vertically integrated exhibitor is unreasonably denying other distributors
access to its screens. 9 Fear of such foreclosure was a primary concern of
92. Ma at 983.
93. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective:
Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, Appendix: Rewriting The Lexicon, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 969, 970, 983 (1987).
94. Id at 983.
95. 1& at 987.
96. Id
97. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 6, at 22.
98. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 201 (1985).
99. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 6, at 208.
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Judge Palmieri in his opinion in 1988 denying Warner's motion for
approval of an interest in Cinamerica.
In the Cinamerica petition, Warner asserted that the factual circum-
stances of the industry had changed so dramatically in the past forty years
that, "the antitrust concerns then present do not exist today."'" For
example, "aftermarkets," such as videocassettes and television, lowered
barriers to entry and market concentration. Moreover, because Cinamerica
accounts for only about 2% of the nation's 22,000 screens, Warner argued
it could not possibly restrain competition. 1'
Judge Palmieri recognized that changes in the marketplace were
"important considerations."'" However, Palmieri rejected Warner's
contention that no anti-competitive impacts would result from its acquisi-
tion. The court pointed out that Cinamerica had a substantial local market
share in many areas including the Westwood area of Los Angeles,
California and Fairfield, Connecticut. In those areas, there was a potential
for foreclosure of access to screen space. Additionally, even though
Cinamerica only comprises about 2% of the nation's screens, together,
Warner and Paramount make up about 30% of the national distribution
market, which is a substantial interest."
Despite the endorsement from the Attorney General, Judge Palmieri
stated '"Warner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the
requested relief would not unreasonably restrain competition."'" As a
result, the district court held that Warner could keep its interest in
Cinamerica only if it agreed to the terms and conditions outlined in the
August 27, 1986 order. The initial restrictions prohibited Warner from
participating in Cinamerica's management, operations and internal
affairs
105
Palmieri firmly rejected the view that federal antitrust law, standing
alone, was sufficient to ensure that the motion picture industry remains
competitive. Furthermore, according to Palmieri, the motion picture
business "has shown a proclivity for anti-competitive behavior when given
the opportunity."" As recently as 1988, Twentieth-Century Fox, a major
defendant in the Paramount case, was found guilty of criminal contempt for
100. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1989).
101. Id.
102. United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. 878, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
103. Id. at 886-88.
104. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 882 F.2d at 32.
105. Id.
106. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 705 F. Supp. at 885.
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failing to comply with the injunction against block booking, one of the
illegal practices enjoined by the Paramount Consent Decrees. 7
While Palmieri has maintained his populist views for over twenty-five
years, other industry leaders have been less consistent regarding whether
studios should be in the theater business. In a 1988 interview, A. Alan
Friedberg, who at the time was President of the independently owned
U.S.A. Cinemas, articulated populists' fears of foreclosure from vertical
integration."°8 Friedberg predicted a scenario in which a theater owner
would not be able to play a film because the picture was "running in a
competing theater, a theater operated by the studio that produced it."1"
Furthermore, according to Friedberg, "[s]omewhere along the line... an
exhibitor in that situation thus discriminated against, thus precluded from
the marketplace, is going to go to court-and you're going to have a new
consent decree, just like you had in 1948. '10
The advantages and disadvantages of vertical integration should be
examined with regard to the source. In 1990 Friedberg became Chairman
of the Board of Loew's Theatre Management Corp. ("Loew's")."
Loew's, with 866 screens, is the fifth largest exhibitor in the nation. 
2
Loew's is also one of the largest vertically integrated circuits. Loew's is
a subsidiary of Sony, the parent company of Tri-Star and Columbia
Pictures."' Either people do not always say what they mean at the
moment or their views depend on when they said it, because in 1991,
Friedberg completely reversed his opinion of the effects of vertical
integration. In an affidavit supporting Loew's petition to terminate its
consent decree, Friedberg testified "elimination of the 1952 Consent
judgment will have no adverse anti-competitive effect."
114
To support his new position, Friedberg cited changes in the distribution
and marketing of motion pictures from the exclusive releases of the 1940's
to the current practice of multiple release patterns. Today, most broad-
107. See United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989).
108. Nat Segaloff & Daniel M. Kimmel, Are Owners of Theater Chains Playing Monopoly?
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 24, 1988, at S2.
109. 1d
110. Id.
111. Daniel F. Cuff, New Loews Chainnan Held 'Ideally Qualified,' N.Y. TIMEs, May 3,
1990, at D5.
112. Klein Affidavit, supra note 2, at 46.
113. Loew's Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.
114. Affidavit of A. Alan Friedberg filed in support of the joint motions of Loew's and Sony
at 6, United States v. Loew's Inc., 783 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (89 Civ. 6159) [hereinafter
Friedberg Affidavit].
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based commercial films are released nationwide to 1800 or more theaters
simultaneously. Since Loew's only accounts for 195 actual theaters, it is
impossible for Loew's to support a national release on the scale of most
commercial distribution. According to Friedberg, "Tri-star... would suffer
financial ruin if it attempted to limit distribution of its film product to
Loew's theaters... 5 Furthermore, Loew's contends "it cannot engage in
competitive foreclosure" because Loew's possesses less than 4% of the
nation's screens and Tri-Star only about 7% film rental share." 6
While it is true that no distributor or exhibitor could survive without
dealing with competitors, there is still some foreclosure potential in highly
concentrated markets without sufficient theaters. In the exhibition industry,
market concentration occurs in local areas and on a regional basis. Theater
markets are divided into zones or areas where theaters compete for
exclusive rights to obtain a film."7 Due to the limited number of theaters
in a particular zone, they compete for a limited audience.
Examples of this are the downtown areas of Boston and Cambridge,
Massachusetts, where Loew's is the only exhibitor.' Boston, with one
of the largest student populations in the country, is the sixth largest motion
picture market. 9 In downtown Boston, Loew's controls all twenty-two
screens and in Cambridge, Loew's controls all twenty-eight screens.'
Even though Loew's controls all the theaters in downtown Boston and
Cambridge, these zones are only a small part of the total first-run market
in the greater Boston area. Loew's does not control the suburbs and
outlying areas where there is vigorous competition between other theater
chains.'
2'
The potential for foreclosure depends on supply and demand. When
distributors glut the market by producing too many films, theaters have
considerable leverage over which pictures to play. Conversely, if there are
115. ME
116. Klein Affidavit, supra note 2, at 4.
117. Conant, supra note 50, at 58.
118. Because Loew's is the only exhibitor in the area, it has a monopsony. 'Monopsony"
refers to a market where there is a single buyer. Monopsony power is monopoly power exerted
by the buyer rather than the seller. Monopsonists in the film industry tend to exercise their power
against distributors by demanding lower licensing terms rather than through higher ticket prices
to moviegoers. United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659, 663 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).
119. Nat Segaloff and Daniel M. Kimmel, Diversity at Issue, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 24, 1988,
at S2.
120. This information comes from the most recent listing of movie theaters in the Boston area.
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 1993, at B9.
121. Id.
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an abundance of screens and insufficient films, studios are able to command
a larger share of box office receipts at the expense of exhibitors."n
Because of the cyclical nature of the theatrical market, some non-
vertically integrated entities will be competitively disadvantaged. For
example, when there are too many films and too few screens a vertically
integrated exhibitor has an incentive to favor its distributor's product. In
this way, integrated theaters could deny access to competing distributors.
Similarly, in the event of a product shortage, the vertically integrated
exhibitor may also be inclined to favor its own films and possibly foreclose
competing exhibitors. These scenarios are obviously aggravated when a
vertically integrated entity denies competitors the opportunity to make a
reasonable offer.
Although there is some foreclosure potential when studios own their
own theaters, this threat is limited. Foreclosure will only occur if there are
insufficient screens to service the supply of film. Situations where a
distributor has enough films to support its own theaters are extremely
rare." 3 Most multiplexes have eight to twelve screens. As a result, no
distributor could survive without showing their competitor's films.
Nevertheless, the very purpose of studio ownership of theaters is to give
distributor-controlled theaters the ability to guarantee outlets for their own
films, reduce uncertainty and promote efficiency.
As the following analysis will demonstrate, from an efficiency
perspective, it makes no economic sense to continue enforcing a decision
which deters producers and distributors from also pursuing a theater
business. Arguably, the prohibitions against studio ownership of theaters
actually thwart populist goals since they tend to create a class of theater
owners who are "dependent on legislative or judicial protection for their
survival."' 4 In this way, the Consent Decrees undermine "the Jeffersoni-
an ideal of entrepreneurs who are independent both of monopolists and of
government."'
125
2. Vertical Integration: Economic Efficiency Arguments
The goal of the Chicago School antitrust policy is to improve the
efficiency of markets and promote competitive conduct, rather than protect
122. MARK LrrwAK, REEL POWER: THE STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE AND SUCCESS IN THE
NEW HOLLYWOOD 255-56 (1986).
123. Klein Affidavit, supra note 2, at 23.
124. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 6, at 24.
125. Ik
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individual competitors. According to this theory, "[i]n most markets the
government would be best off if it left entry and exit unregulated." '26
Some proponents of the Chicago School argue that vertical mergers should
be lawful because they enhance efficiency and innovation.1"
Economic efficiency advocates criticize populists for discouraging
conduct, like vertical mergers, that promotes efficiency." For instance,
vertical mergers enhance a business' productive efficiency by either
allowing the firm to reduce its price and increase its market share or earn
greater profits without raising prices.129 Furthermore, according to
Harvard law professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, "In the vast
majority of instances, integration reflects adaptation to more efficient ways
of doing business or, less frequently but also desirably, an effort to
overcome high prices or other poor competitive performance in vertically
related markets."' 30
There has been little opposition by the Justice Department to consolida-
tion in the motion picture industry because the government follows the
economic efficiency rationale that vertical integration is not illegal."'
The position that vertical integration is not illegal "follows accepted
economic analysis. ' 32 For example, a vertical merger does not add to or
create economic power.133  Not only is "there nothing inherently anti-
competitive about a vertical merger," it is unlikely that a vertical merger by
itself would raise entry barriers." Thus, vertical mergers do not result
in a "substantial lessening of competition," nor do they "eliminate a
competing buyer or seller from the market."
1 35
Another justification for vertical integration is that no matter how
vertically integrated a firm is, it cannot add to its market power by vertical
linkages alone. Businesses are "profit-maximizers." Managers make
business decisions they expect will result in the greatest profit for their
divisions.1 36  Distributors will sell their product to buyers that offer the
126. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213,227 (1985).
127. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 6, at 208; ROBERT BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
226, 245 (1978).
128. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy,
75 CAL. L. REv. 797, 798 (1987).
129. Hovenkamp, supra note 126, at 238.
130. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 6, at 206.
131. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 130, 174 (1947).
132. Conant, supra note 50, at 88.
133. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 6, at 207.
134. Id. at 253.
135. Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979).
136. Hovenkamp, supra note 126, at 228.
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most advantageous terms or the best profit potential. If an unaffiliated
exhibitor offers a distributor a better deal or a higher grossing theater, then
the distributor will license its picture to the unaffiliated theater. Similarly,
if Paramount owns theaters in a particular market and could make more
money by playing a Warner film, Paramount will play the competition's
films over its own. In short, vertical integration is essentially harmless
because no one would pass up more profit for the sake of their own
theaters.
The Justice Department has decided not to enforce the Paramount
Consent Decrees. Joining Warner in its appeal of Judge Palmieri's decision
prohibiting participation in Cinamerica's management, operations or internal
affairs, the Justice Department argued that Warner had met its burden under
the consent decrees. Furthermore, the government contended that not only
was "there nothing inherently anti-competitive about a vertical merger...
the evolution of the motion picture industry since Paramount Pictures
makes it improbable that Warner could or would ... stifle competi-
tion."' 7 The court of appeals agreed with the Justice Department and the
court held that Warner's interest in Cinamerica was not likely to increase
barriers to entry, restrain competition or foreclose competing exhibitors or
distributors.'38 On remand, the court of appeals instructed the district
court to eliminate all restrictions accompanying Warner's ownership and
operation of Cinamerica.3 9
The Justice Department's rationalization of its support for deregulating
the exhibition industry is that the industry has drastically changed. For
instance, the studios operate in a completely different marketing environ-
ment than during the time of the Paramount decisions. Because of new
channels of distribution, competition for the consumers' entertainment
dollar is significantly greater today than during the 1930's and 1940's.1
40
This is reflected in the motion picture revenue mix. Distributors produce
income by licensing theatrical, television and videocassette rights.
Additionally, studios now earn more revenue from home video than from
theatrical distribution.'
4'
The impact of technological innovations is further reflected in changes
in demand for moviegoing. Ticket sales declined from a high of 4.1 billion
in 1946, to 1.08 billion in 1962, and for the past twenty-five years,
137. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 32-33.
138. Id. at 33.
139. Id. at 34.
140. Id. at 31-32.
141. Filmed Entertainment Growth: A Five-Year Forecast, BoxOFFICE, Oct. 1990, at 54.
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admissions have remained at around one billion.142 Americans attended
approximately twenty-nine movies a year in 1946 as compared to five times
a year in 1984.143 Furthermore, in 1988, nearly four times as many
consumers watched films on videocassette than went to theaters.
44
Another reason for not enforcing the prohibition against theater
ownership is because it is unfair to hold Warner, MGM and Fox to a
different standard. Paramount has always been able to acquire theaters
without court approval. Universal has never been enjoined from owning
theaters.145 In addition, there are several new studios and national theater
circuits which have entered the market since the Paramount decision who
are not bound by the decrees."4 New entrants in production and distribu-
tion include Tri-Star, Orion and Buena Vista. In exhibition, independent
theater circuits like General Cinema, United Artists Theater Circuit and
American MultiCinema have significant market power.147 Finally, after
the 1992 motion to terminate Loew's consent judgments, Cinamerica is now
the only major theater circuit that is still directly constrained by the
Paramount Consent Decrees.
148
Judge Conner notes in his opinion that anti-competitive practices
prohibited by the consent decrees are still forbidden by existing law.
Moreover, the motion picture industry is "fully subject to the antitrust laws
of general application.!" 49  If a vertically integrated distributor tries to
foreclose competitors from access to theaters or pictures, the injured party
has the remedy of treble damages through a private civil action.150
"Treble damages provide a powerful incentive for parties to detect and sue
for antitrust violations, and they discourage illegal conduct by increasing
the probability of suits and the cost to the violator."' Furthermore,
142. A.D. Murphy, Lousy Pics Sole Valid Scapegoat, VARETY, July 16, 1986, at 3.
143. McCoy, supra note 65, at 32, 34.
144. Id. at 33.
145. Phillips, supra note 33, at 11.
146. McCoy, supra note 65, at 32; United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 31.
147. McCoy, supra note 65, at 32-33; Klein Affidavit, supra note 2, at 30.
148. United States v. Loew's Inc., 783 F. Supp. 211,214 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Although Tri-Star
never owned theaters, it was necessary for its owner, Sony, to petition for termination of a 1987
order resulting from Tri-Star's acquisition of Loew's. That order forced Tn-Star and Loew's to
be bound by the distributor conduct restrictions of the 1980 Loew's order. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
149. United States v. Loew's Inc., 783 F. Supp. at 214.
150. Peter J. Dekom, Counseling Clients in the Entertainment Industry, in THE MOTION
PICrURE IN 1987: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC TURMOIL, at 149, 153 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 237, 1987).
151. Milton Handler, Foreword, 75 CAL. L. REV. 787, 811 (1987).
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judicial scrutiny governs all future vertical acquisitions. 52 Based on the
above measures and the threat of treble damages, there is adequate
protection in the antitrust laws.
Loew's, in its memorandum to vacate its 1952 consent decree, argued
that termination of the judgment is "in the public interest. ,1 53 The
government agreed, contending that conduct restrictions are no longer
necessary and some of the prohibitions are actually pro-competitive:
The Government sees no current need for Loew's to be subject to
legal constraints beyond those generally applicable to all other
exhibition companies, including Loew's competitors. Continuation
of the 1952 Loew's Judgment ... appears unnecessary and their
perpetuation might deter otherwise permissible and desirable
competitive behavior. Consequently, the government has tentatively
concluded that the public interest would be best served by the entry
of a suitable termination order."5
For example, Loew's is unable to enter into a proposed joint venture
with a real estate development group. The developers have other theater
holdings, and Loew's is prohibited by the consent decree from participating
in any joint ownership with an actual or potential independent exhibi-
tor.15 5 Thus, the judgment restricts "the availability of investment capital
for theatre expansion and ... the availability of qualified and competent
personnel who may want to have an equity interest with Loew's."' 56
The judgment also prohibits franchise agreements, formula deals, master
agreements and joint ventures. These prohibitions are no longer anti-
competitive and could be pro-competitive. Master agreements and formula
deals are enjoined under the Paramount case because they facilitated the
horizontal conspiracy in which the major studios gave each other's theaters
preferential treatment in securing bookings.1 57 Today, studios no longer
control exhibition. Mann Theaters, a West Coast subsidiary of Cinamerica,
only comprises about 1.9% of the nation's screens and Loew's only about
3.8%. Furthermore, no vertically integrated studio dominates first-run
152. "[P]roposed vertical mergers [receive] careful scrutiny to ensure that any proposed
integration will not unreasonably restrain competition in the motion picture industry." United
States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d at 34. Premerger notification and waiting requirements for
corporations planning to consummate large mergers and acquisitions are also governed by statute.
Id.; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
153. Loew's Memorandum, supra note 3, at 8.
154. Government Memorandum, supra note 2, at 10.
155. Id. at 9; Friedberg Affidavit, supra note 114, at 2.
156. Friedberg Affidavit, supra note 114, at 3.
157. Loew's Memorandum, supra note 3, at 26.
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theaters on the same s6ale as the major studios of the 1940's. As a result,
the possibility of horizontal collusion on the same scale as in the 1940's is
highly unlikely. 5  Even if horizontal collusion occurs, the general
antitrust laws offer sufficient protection for independents. 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The motion picture business is inherently volatile and uncertain.
History reveals that when studios attempt to control distribution systems,
anti-competitive business practices often result. However, horizontal
conspiracies rather than vertical integration are the source of the problem.
The purpose of the prohibitions against studio ownership of theaters is
to prevent horizontal conspiracies, not to protect small, independently
owned theaters. Changes in demand, technological innovations and market
structure have permanently altered the structure and nature of the motion
picture industry from the era when the decrees were originally imposed.
As a result, there is no realistic possibility of a return to the economic
structure or collusive business practices that gave rise to the consent
decrees. Finally, the prohibitions against studio ownership of theaters may
actually deter efficient, pro-competitive behavior. In short, these prohibi-
tions are an anachronism that make no economic sense in today's
marketplace.
158. Md at 24.
159. Id. at 26.
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